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Abstract
This paper presents some fundamental collective choice theory for
information system designers, particularly those working in the field of
computer–supported cooperative work. This paper is focused on a pre-
sentation of Arrow’s Possibility and Impossibility theorems which form
the fundamental boundary on the efficacy of collective choice: voting and
selection procedures. It restates the conditions that Arrow placed on col-
lective choice functions in more rigorous second–order logic, which could
be used as a set of test conditions for implementations, and a useful prob-
abilistic result for analyzing votes on issue pairs. It also describes some
simple collective choice functions. There is also some discussion of how
enterprises should approach putting their resources under collective con-
trol: giving an outline of a superstructure of performative agents to carry
out this function and what distributing processing technology would be
needed.
1 Collective Choice in Information Systems
1.1 Naming Services
1. Windows NT
If one uses a system then, from time to time, one might receive an event
message saying that “The Browser Has Forced an Election...” [MSK99a,
MSK99b].
2. The Internet and the Domain Naming Service DNS
Internet connected systems could not function without the Domain Nam-
ing Service and this too relies upon elections: individual system adminis-
trators choose when their name–server is to authoritative or not [Wel99,
Ricly] and which name–servers it will rely upon.
The difference between the two systems is that Windows NT is designed to
manage the naming of relatively small domains and can use a direct election
amongst all its naming components, the browsers. This is represented in figure
1, where the master browser is elected by the itself and the other browsers.
The browsers apply the same fitness criteria in choosing their
master. There can be no conflict in policy.
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Figure 1: Browser programs choosing a master browser
The Internet’s DNS has to rely upon a loosely co–ordinated database of
name servers. This is represented in figure 2. Here the Administrator of each
DNS chooses which other DNS it will use to resolve names. In this example,
for all names other than their own, the Superior Administrator is chosen as
authoritative.
The Administrators need not apply the same fitness criteria in
choosing their superior DNS. There may be conflicts in policy.
They can therefore attempt malevolent actions collectively if they so wish,
for example:
Consider an electronic commerce web site. The user’s web browser
makes a secure connection to the site, providing a protected chan-
nel. If the DNS entry for the server’s address was replaced by one
indicating an attacker’s address, the browser will connect to the ma-
licious site, possibly without the user’s knowledge. In this scenario,
the DNS spoofer could monitor the traffic over the “secure” connec-
tion, since the secure connection would actually be to the spoofer,
and forward the transaction data to the real website or process the
traffic itself [Wel99].
Without human intervention, computer programs have wholly predictable
behaviour and cannot possess ulterior motives: people can. (The problems that
can arise from badly managed networks are described to a much greater extent
in [EFL+97].)
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Figure 2: DNS Administrators choosing a superior DNS
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But even if computer programs have predictable behaviour they
may not apply the same fitness criteria in making choices. This may
lead to conflicts in policy.
1.2 Groups choosing policies
Most people will have come across moderated newsgroups and mailing lists.
Potentially these services could be made self–managing and would be simple
examples of a computer–supported working environments.
1. Joining the Group
A policy decision is needed to determine whether or not an individual
should be allowed to join a particular group and take the rights and priv-
ileges enjoyed by its members. A collective choice, probably by a mem-
bership committee, is made based upon the applicant’s credentials.
The procedure is usually carried out using a set of recommendations. The
individual requesting the rights fills in a form stating his credentials. Peo-
ple are assigned to check the applicant’s trustworthiness, qualifications and
so forth. If the membership committee is satisfied, someone is instructed
to assign the applicant to the group.
2. Expulsion from the Group
Should the membership committee decide to expel an individual from the
group, that, too, would be a collective policy decision.
A situation that could clearly arise is for a number of individuals to infiltrate
a group, subvert it by having themselves elected to the membership committe
and then expelling all the members of the group who are not sympathetic to
the infiltrators. Of course, those individuals might also do this legitimately, if
the selection of the membership committee reflected the views of the current
membership. What legitimates actions is a wider consensus.
1.3 Lattices and Access Control
Organizing the membership of groups is a sub–process needed for the formation
of lattices of membership classes for an access control system, first put forward
by Denning in [Den76]. The only provably safe access control systems are those
that are based on Mandatory Access Control, MAC, schemes, also as described
by Denning [Den82].
1.3.1 Operating Systems
Discretionary Access Control, DAC, schemes are used in most multi–user operat-
ing systems such as VAX–VMS [Cor84] and Unix [Cur90] and resource–sharing
operating systems such asWindows NT [Jum98]. These are not as discretionary
as one might think:
• Individual users are allocated to groups
• Privileged User(s): the “super–user” or “Administrator” set group mem-
berships.
It could be described as a dictatorial Discretionary Access Control scheme.
The only latitude that individuals have is to be able to grant or deny access
rights to members of their own group or to everyone. The privileged user can
undo any access control operations performed by any individual.
To use some better terminology: subjects are entities who may possess access
rights and objects are those entities to which subjects have rights to use. An
operating system that uses a MAC scheme is represented in figure 3 and one
that uses a DAC scheme is represented in figure 4.
1. MAC Scheme
This is a simple scheme. The administrator classifies all the subjects and
the objects and it classifies some subjects above other subjects so that
higher subjects can access everything that lower subjects can.
Subject
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Figure 3: Mandatory Access Control Scheme
2. DAC Scheme
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This is more sophisticated. The administrator classifies all the subjects
and can denote that they belong to certain a Group. Every subject belongs
to the group of Everyone.
Individual subjects own some objects and can choose to grant access to
• Either: their groups (or groups)
• Or: to Everyone
Groups do not own anything and neither can the group Everyone. In
figure 4, the object A is owned by one of the subjects and has allowed
access to the group its owner belongs to and to Everyone. The object B
can be accessed by the group, but not by Everyone.
There is degree of autonomny granted to the subjects in that they may
classify objects to be accessible to the members of the groups they belong
to, but they may not choose which group, or groups, they belong to.
Neither may they change ownership of an object they own1.
1.3.2 Database Management Systems DBMS
Some DBMSs have more flexible DACs which allow some individuals to be more
privileged than others by granting them the right to grant rights. This feature
is available in some DBMSs that support the Structured Query Language, SQL,
which was based upon System–R, which is descibed by Denning in [Den89].
In effect, this is the same as the DAC scheme for operating systems, see
figure 4, but the owner can grant access to subjects other than those in its
group and it can grant to others the right to grant access, but not to those to
whom access has been explicitly denied by the owner.
1.4 General Resource Management Systems
Information processing systems can be thought of as general resource manage-
ment systems and the Open Distributed Processing ODP standards, in par-
ticular the prescriptive model, [ISO95], describe how an enterprise modelling
language could be used to state the relationships between resource owners and
users as behavioural contracts given in terms of a set of permissions, prohibi-
tions and obligations. This can be seen as a generalization of the MAC and
DAC schemes, but the ODP standards are only reference models and each in-
formation system should contain some component that embodies its enterprise
model. This is a wholly new superstructure to an information processing sys-
tem: there are some simple class relationships describing the ODP model set
out in appendix A, these rather vaguely state the information model for the
superstructure. Some mechanisms that could be used for applying policy, im-
plementing the administrators, has already been proposed [Eav99b].
Recently, the Java programming environment has provided a powerful lan-
guage for expressing permissions [SUN98]. However, it assumes the existence
of some agent which would negotiate the contracts between resource owner and
user. There have been only a few efforts made to develop arbitrator agents
which could generate such contracts.
1A POSIX [Lew91] requirement, Unix typically does allow ownerships to be changed.
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There are some system proposals which attempt to apply abstract behavioural
rules in terms of concrete permissions: in papers by Minsky [Min89, Min95].
Minsky’s treatment is for information processing systems in general, but a pa-
per by Rabitti et al. [RBKW91] describes authorization generation mechanisms
which support a lattice model of authorization policy for an object–oriented
database. The innovation of the system is that it generates authorization policy
as it operates. Authorization is viewed as having three dimensions:
Expression Authorizations specified by users, which are known as explicit and
those that are derived by the system as known as implicit.
Direction An authorization can be positive, stating what may be done, or
negative stating what may not be done.
Strength An authorization may be strong, in which case it may not be over-
ridden, or weak, in which it can.
This model has been extended [BW94] and a recent contribution by Castano
[Cas97] introduces metrics that can be used to generate concrete permissions
from more abstract specifications, including:
• Operation compatibility
• Individuality similarity co–efficient
• Authorization compatability
• Semantic correspondence
• Clustering of Individuals
Although Bertino et al. attempt to produce mechanical means of generating
authorization policy no–one would seriously expect a system to be driven wholly
by mechanical recommendation, it would require choices to be made by people
and, if that is the case, then a suitable collective choice procedure must be
found.
1.5 Summary
Information processing systems are not mechanical systems. They represent
the interests of people and the agents that comprise an information processing
system will require policies that represent people’s interests which will be used
in formulating behavioural contracts between agents that own resources and the
agents that use them.
2 Issues in Collective Choice Theory
The principal difficulty in collective choice theory is that if a group of people
have to choose between more than two issues, there is no choice procedure they
can adopt that is not open to abuse. By abuse, it is meant:
• Denial of service: some agent can exercise a veto on any policy proposed.
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• Enforced service: some agent can force a policy upon others.
An abuse takes the form of insincere behaviour: an agent acts not to fulfil his
own interests, but to prevent others from fulfilling theirs.
This simple example, known as the Voting Paradox might help:
Scenario 2.1 (Denial of Service by Policy Cycle). Three agents, x, y and
z, have to choose between three services: A, B and C. x and y rank sincerely, but
z ranks the policies to prevent x and y from reaching a compromise, i.e. policy
A, see table 1.
Agent Ranking
x A > B > C
y C > A > B
z B > C > A
Table 1: Policy cycle used to deny service
Just to clarify terminology: an election is an expression of collective choice
and the policy chosen by an election is the outcome of what statisticians might
call a trial. In a trial, there are a number of choices available to each voter, or
individual, taking part. A policy is usually chosen with regard to an issue; the
proposal that a policy should be followed regarding an issue is called a motion.
2.1 Two Policy Issues
This could also be described as a a two outcome trials. These arise when there
are only two policies which can result: the choice is to accept a policy or not.
1. Number of Choices is always three
Although there are two policies, there are three choices: one can vote For
or Against. One may also be given the explicit right to Abstain, and, by
doing so, state that one cannot vote for or against. One may also choose
Not to Vote.
2. Abstentions and Not Voting
Usually in referenda, there is no option to abstain and those who do not
vote are considered to have abstained. This assumption is legitimate if one
is sure that all individuals who are entitled to vote have been informed
that they may do so and have made a decision not to. In most business
processes, this would not be the case.
In what follows, it is assumed that all abstentions are explicitly made and
that individuals who do not vote have excluded themselves.
3. Choice Function
Simple majority rule is the usual method for resolving two policy elections,
but it by no means the only one. Two policy collective choice is dealt with
in some detail in appendix B.
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What is required from a choice function is that it is not open to abuse and
it is decisive. Two policy issues can not be abused because it can be shown
to be the case that the majority have chosen the policy. The only difficulty is
resolving ties.
2.2 Three policy issues
A three–outcome trial, for example, one of A,B or C must be chosen. The
voting procedures described here are explained at greater length in [Saa94] and
and there is some documentation on voting methods at [VOT98]. What follows
illustrates some of the problems that arise from using them.
1. Number of Choices can vary
(a) Four Choices
One can organize the election so that are four choices: any of A,B
or C and to abstain.
(b) Seven (or Eleven) Choices
One could also allow voters to express a choice between their first
two preferences and to abstain. So a vote might be: (A,B) which
implies that A > B > C.
One can also allow voters to state they are indifferent between their
first two choices, but prefer them to the third; an example of this
kind of vote is: (A = B) > C.
(c) Thirteen (or Seven) Choices
Also one can allow voters to express their choices as a ranking over
all three policies, in two ways:
• Strong ordering no statements of indifference allowed.
• Weak ordering statements of indifference are allowed.
The former allows seven choices of rankings, the latter thirteen.
2. Choice Functions
(a) Simple Majority Rule
This could only be used when the voters are presented with four
choices and clearly would not work:
• Three voters: a tie can result from a policy cycle and can be
used by one voter to deny service, see table 1.
• Seven voters: if three vote A, two B and two C, then, even
though a majority did not want A, A is chosen.
(b) Single Transferable Vote
This could be used when the voters are presented with seven or eleven
choices. It suffers from the same problem as the next procedure.
(c) Hare Voting System and Borda Preferendum
These two can be used if one presents to the voters thirteen or seven
choices; they, and the Single Transferable Vote procedure, all suffer
from the same fault, [Dor79, Fis73], which is that voting is affected
10
Policy and Ranking
Voter w x y z
i 4(3) 3(-) 2(2) 1(1)
j 4(3) 3(-) 2(2) 1(1)
k 1(1) 2(-) 4(3) 3(2)
9(7) 8(-) 8(7) 5(4)
Table 2: The Borda “Preferendum”
by irrelevant alternatives. This is best illustrated by using the results
of a Borda Preferendum which has each voter rank their alternatives
in order, see table 2.
If the voters i, j and k are asked to rank the four policies w, x, y and
z, then the order is w > x > y > z, but if asked to choose between
w, y and z then (w = y) > z, but it was clear that w was preferred
over y. The anomaly being that an irrelevant policy, x, serves to
differentiate between relevant ones.
(d) Condorcet Procedure
This procedure is often employed in committees but also suffers from
irrelevant alternatives affecting the selection of a final choice. (There
are some good examples of how a Condorcet procedure can be abused
in [Saa94].) It is simply a series of two policy elections: (A,B), (A,C)
and (B,C). If any policy beats the other two, then it is chosen. If
there is a policy cycle then there is no Condorcet winner. It may also
allow an irrelevant alternative to beat a potential Condorcet winner.
It will be shown that there is no satisfactory choice function for more than
two policy issues. The next note shows that the number of different orderings
for a given number of issues increases dramatically.
2.3 n policy issues
The total number of different weak orderings for n policies can be calculated as
follows:
1. Generate all the partitions[Ski90, p. 56] of n.
2. Calculate the number of permutations for each partition, call thisN(partitions).
3. For each partition find the number of number of ways in which the policies
could be allocated to the elements of the partition, N(policies).
4. Multiply N(partitions) by N(policies) for each partition and sum them
together.
ΣpartitionsN(policies) N(partitions) (1)
A Mathematica[Ins99] package is available[Eav99a] that performs the calcu-
lation. Table 3 lists the total number of different preference orders for up to 6
policies and clearly shows how large the search space becomes.
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Policies Orderings
1 1
2 3
3 13
4 75
5 541
6 4683
Table 3: Number of Different Preference Orderings for n policies
2.4 Sincere and Sophisticated Voting
Sophisticated voting utilizes some strategy whereby a voter does not vote for
their first choice to ensure that their least–preferred policy is not chosen. For
example, an electorate of seven votes sincerely for three policies x, y and z thus:
4 x, 3 y and 2 z, then x would be chosen. However, the z voters may prefer y
to x so their sophisticated vote is for y.
An interesting example of a sophisticated vote is global abstention. If a
motion is formulated which requires a choice between A or B, but all voters
prefer C which is not proposed, a sophisticated response is a global abstention.
Unfortunately, sophisticated voters enjoy an advantage over sincere voters,
but, to do so, they must formulate their own voting policy, which usually re-
quires that they have some information as to the relative strengths of the dif-
ferent coalitions within an electorate and their choice of voting policy would,
presumably, be decided by a sincere vote amongst them. One of the attractions
of presenting an electorate with a complex agenda—of more than two issues—
is that they are less able to formulate strategies amongst themselves, so that
complex agendas should elicit more sincere voting, but the likelihood of a policy
cycle arising is greater, as is made clear in a later section, §5 and by equation
(2). Sincere voting would allow voters’ underlying values to more precisely de-
termined, which one would hope, would in the long–run be a more stable basis
for decision–making.
3 Collective Choice Mathematical Model
This is more rigorous presentation of collective choice theory. This following
section introduces the notation that will be used to formalize the conditions
that are placed on collective choice functions.
3.1 Some Notation
Notation 3.1 (Relations, Preferences and Their Ordering: ≻). is a pref-
erence ordering over a set of objects in a finite set X = {x1, . . . , xn} constructed
thus:
R is an instance of a class of binary relations between any two objects. To
state that x1 is related to x2 in some way, one would write: x1 R x2. The
particular relation might be any of the following >,≥,≤,=. At this stage,
R is taken to be transitive and connected.
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≻ is a statement of an individual’s preference order or preferences over the
elements of X . It is a tuple, i.e. a vector, with exactly #X elements,
with each element being of the form xi R xj , where R is instantiated to
one of the values that the class might take. The ordering is assumed to
be consistent for whatever qualities R possesses. There must be at least
one statement of preference for each element of X , even if that statement
is one of indifference. It is assumed that such a preference ordering is
consistent with the qualities of R. The power set of ≻ is X ×X
Notation 3.2 (Policies and Voters). Some simple set definitions are needed.
I is the set of voters or individuals I = {1, . . . , i, . . . , n}.
X a non–empty set is the universal set of social alternatives, or policies, at least
one of which must be chosen by the voters.
X is a subset of the power set P (X) of X ; it is a non–empty set of non–empty
subsets of X and describes the potential feasible policy sets of X .
Y is an element of X . It is the set of policies that are presented to an electorate
for them to vote on: the proposal set.
~D is a preference profile of all voters, it will be called a vote, but will contain
more than just the voters’ preferences on the elements of the proposal set.
It contains the preference orders of all the individuals in the society for all
alternatives in X . For the n individuals, if individual i is presumed to have
a preference order ≻i, ~D can be written as the n-tuple (≻1,≻2, . . . ,≻n)
of preference orders on X .
P
(
~D
)
is the power set of all votes, feasible and infeasible. For a given set of
policies and a given set of individuals only a subset of these votes will
occur.
(Y, ~D) is an ordered pair called the situation. It is the feasible set of policies,
Y , presented to the electorate, and a vote ~D.
The important word is feasible. Only some votes will be feasible given the
preferences held by voters; therefore only some policy sets will be feasible.
Definition 3.1 (Sincere and Sophisticated). The following function defini-
tions clarify how voters make up their minds and form their preference orders.
They are, therefore, purely notional and one or the other is performed by each
individual, i. How a preference order is formed is dependent on whether the
individual votes sincerely or is sophisticated.
If an individual, or population, is voting sincerely, then:
sincere : I ×X 7→ X ×X
sincere : X 7→ P
(
~D
) e.g. ≻i = sincere(i,X)
~D = sincere(X)
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If an individual is a sophisticated voter, then a new set of histories is needed:
~D—and its power set P
(
~D
)
—which is the set of all votes that have taken place.
sophisticated: I ×X × P
(
~D
)
7→ X ×X
sophisticated: X 7→ P
(
~D
)
e.g. ≻i = sophisticated(i,X, ~D)
~D = sophisticated(X, ~D)
Definition 3.2 (Promotion and Demotion). When stating conditions it is
useful to construct votes from other votes. These may be elements of P
(
~D
)
that are infeasible.
These functions promote and demote a policy within a vote.
promote: P
(
~D
)
×X 7→ P
(
~D
)
e.g. ~D′ = promote(x, ~D)
And similarly,
demote: P
(
~D
)
×X 7→ P
(
~D
)
e.g. ~D′ = demote(x, ~D)
demote() would be implemented as follows:
1. Every preference not involving x is unchanged:
∀x′, y′ ∈ X[(x′ 6= x, y′ 6= x, x′ R y′ ∈≻i, x
′ R′ y′ ∈ ≻′i)
→ (x′ R y′ ↔ x′ R′ y′)]
2. Everything that involves x is unchanged if x if preferred over something
else; or is changed so that x is now preferred over the other policy
∀y′ ∈ X[x > y′ ∈≻i→ x > y
′ ∈ ≻′i]
or
∀y′ ∈ X[x = y′ ∈≻i→ x > y
′ ∈ ≻′i]
Along the same lines, two other variants of promote and demote can be
defined, which promote or demote for a particular voter on a particular policy
and resolve any conflicts.
~D′ = promote(i, x, ~D) and ~D′ = demote(i, x, ~D)
Definition 3.3 (Collective Choice Function). Is a function that maps each
situation to a subset of the feasible subsets for that situation. The collective
choice function F yields the choice set of the proposal set.
F : X × P
(
~D
)
7→ X F (Y, ~D) ⊆ Y
Typically the choice set will contain only one policy, the one that is preferred
over all others. The chosen policy can then be removed from Y and the next
policy found. In the event of a tie—if ties are tolerated—the choice set will
contain the tied policies.
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Remark 3.1 (Quorums). A quorum is usually taken to be the minimum num-
ber of voters that can demand that a policy be a legitimate choice. However, it
may be that case that there is a quorum, but all votes, bar one, are abstentions
and that the choice of that single individual becomes mandatory.
For the time being, this anomaly should be noted, and there will be references
in the text to the validity of a policy decision.
3.2 Conditions on a Collective Choice Function
These conditions prescribe the behaviour of a collective choice function2. These
are derived from Arrow’s work[Arr63] and have been the subject of consid-
erable debate. This rendering is original and, it is hoped, is more explicit,
self–contained and rigorous than that given in Arrow’s work. Each condition is
expressed as a deduction rule in second–order logic: if the premises are fulfilled
then the conclusion is required i.e. it is expected behaviour. The conditions
therefore constitute tests for an implementation of a collective choice function.
A more succinct rendering can be found in a paper by Batteau et al. [PB81].
It requires some familiarity with Arrow’s conditions and the theory of games3,
but has the advantage of relating Arrow’s conditions to work in games theory
and also to requirements on the behaviour of collective choice functions. This
latter task has been carried out very successfully by Fishburn[Fis74], but only for
two issue collective choice functions. The paper by Batteau et al. only addresses
collective choice functions that use strong orderings.
There are five conditions in all. There is a brief description of the meaning
of each.
Condition 3.1 (Admissible Orderings). This is a specification that the func-
tion need only operate on what are called admissible orderings, an individual’s
ordering is admissible if it alone satisfies the collective choice function, viz.
∀Y ∈ X
∀i∃ ~D[ ~D = (≻i),∅ 6= F (Y, ~D) ⊂ Y ]
∃ ~D′[ ~D′ = (≻1, . . . ,≻i, . . . ,≻n),∅ 6= F (Y, ~D) ⊂ Y ]
By specifying that individual voters must present orderings that are proper
subsets of Y , this eliminates orderings that are completely indifferent or are
cyclical, e.g.X = {x, y, z},≻i= ( x > y, y > z, z > x)—so it is a condition on
the vote set as well as on the collective choice function. In practice, it would be
best to ensure that the orderings in ~D are well–formed.
The choice set F () cannot be empty and it must be a proper subset of Y . If
it is neither of these then there is either global indifference or a policy cycle.
Condition 3.2 (Monotonicity). or “positive association of social and indi-
vidual values”[Arr63, p. 25]: put simply if the individuals want something and
choose it for their society; if, in a later vote, more individuals choose it, then,
2The more common term is social choice function, but this due to its origin in social welfare
economics.
3See for example, [BO82].
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ceterus paribus, it will be chosen for society again, or, more formally:
∀Y ∈ X
∀ ~D∃S[F (Y, ~D) = S]
∀x ∈ S∃ ~D′[ ~D′ = promote(x, ~D)]
∃S′[S′ = F (Y, ~D′), x ∈ S′]
Condition 3.3 (Independence). or “independence of irrelevant alternatives”
[Arr63, p. 27] requires that the collective choice function return a choice set
regardless of any individual’s preferences for policies that are not explicitly part
of the proposal set. This means that individuals may take on or discard values,
or they may change their values regarding other matters, but these changes
should not effect those values that have not changed. Formally, this can be
expressed thus:
∀Y ∈ X
∃X,X ′[Y ⊆ X, Y ⊆ X ′, X 6= X ′]
∀ ~D, ~D′[ ~D = sincere(X), ~D′ = sincere(X ′), F (Y, ~D) = F (Y, ~D′)]
This condition on the implementation of the collective choice function is proba-
bly unimportant in practice; normally, the input to the collective choice function
is ~D which only contains the preferences on the contents of Y , but as can be de-
duced from the discussion of the effect of an irrelevant alternative in the Borda
preferendum, see table 2, these can affect a preference order.
The following two conditions are more contentious. They are different from
the other conditions in that they need not be applicable to all issues and there
are two types of tests one can apply.
Condition 3.4 (Non–imposition). There is no bias in the collective choice
function that causes it, on some issues, to yield a choice set that is insensitive
to voters’ preferences.
The first test is a unilateral test, viz.
∃Y ∈ X
∀ ~D∃S[S = F (Y, ~D)]
∀x ∈ S∃ ~D′[ ~D′ = demote(x, ~D)]
∄S′[S′ = F (Y, ~D′), S′ ∩ S 6= ∅]
That is, it should be possible on a particular set of issues to construct a vote
that does not return a particular policy for all votes that select that policy.
The second test is used in the event of a tie between some policies to ensure
that the collective choice function does not prefer one policy over the other.
∃Y ∈ X [#Y ≥ 3]
∃S[#S ≥ 1, F (Y, ~D) = S]
∀y, z ∈ Y \ S[y 6= z]
∀w∃Y ′[¬(w ∈ Y ), Y ′ = Y ∪ {w}]
∃ ~D′[ ~D′ = sincere(Y ′)]
∄S′[S′ = F (Y ′, ~D′), (y ∈ S′ ∧ ¬(z ∈ S′)) ∨ (z ∈ S′ ∧ ¬(y ∈ S′))]
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It might not be immediately clear from this formulation but this is an exact
statement of the irrelevant alternative anomaly observed in the Borda preferen-
dum, see table 2.
Condition 3.5 (Non–dictatorial). There is no one individual whose choice
on some issues is always returned by the collective choice function, a dictator,
nor is there any one individual who can reject some policies, a vetoer4. (Unfor-
tunately, there is some contention about the use of the term “one individual”,
see the discussion following.)
1. Unilateral Tests
These test whether it is possible to overcome a dictator’s choice or a
vetoer’s rejection. The dictator or vetoer is placed in position 1 for con-
venience.
(a) Dictator
∃Y ∈ X
∃S∃ ~D[ ~D = (≻1), S = F (Y, ~D)]
∀x ∈ S∃ ~D′[∀ ≻i [i 6= 1,≻i= demote(x,≻i)], ~D
′ = (≻1, . . . ,≻n)]
∄S′[S′ = F (Y, ~D′), S′ ∩ S 6= ∅
(b) Vetoer
∃Y ∈ X
∃ ~D∃Sc[ ~D = (≻1), S
c = Y \ F (Y, ~D)]
∀x ∈ Sc∃ ~D′[∀ ≻i [i 6= 1,≻i= promote(x,≻i)], ~D
′ = (≻1, . . . ,≻n)]
∄S′c[S′c = Y \ F (Y, ~D′), S′c ∩ Sc 6= ∅]
2. Tie–Breaking Tests
Subtler tests are those that are applied in the event of a tie.
(a) Dictator
The dictator is preferred in some way. In that, if the dictator changes
allegiance, policy changes, but if anyone else it does not.
∃Y ∈ X [#Y ≥ 3]
∃S[S ⊂ Y,#S ≥ 1]
∀y[y ∈ Y \ S]
∀i∃ ~D′i[
~D′i = promote(i, y,
~D)]
∀i∃Si[F (Y, ~D
′
i) = Si]
∄j∀i[i 6= j, Si 6= Sj]
4Vetoer is a noun constructed solely for the purposes of this exposition.
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(b) Vetoer
∃Y ∈ X [#Y ≥ 3]
∃S[S ⊂ Y,#S = 1]
∃x[x ∈ S]
∀i∃ ~D′i[
~D′i = demote(i, x,
~D)]
∀i∃Si[F (Y, ~D
′
i) = Si]
∄j∀i[i 6= j, Si 6= Sj]
This definition states that “no one individual” can dictate a vote, which
would seem to suggest that individuals can change their minds, but must do
so en masse. Arrow requires that a deciding set5 of voters must change their
preferences. How many need to be in that set can only be determined by
analyzing a vote. It may appear that simple majority rule does not appear to
meet this criteria, since, in a close result, any voter can invert the result, but
under simple majority rule on two issues, this can be dismissed, because every
voter has exactly the same capability, therefore the simple majority becomes
the decisive set.
So, as it stands, this condition is still not accurately expressed, it should
state that no subset of voters that is not a deciding set can change the outcome.
The problem is that the deciding set cannot be known until the votes have been
cast and counted.
4 Possibility and Impossibility Theorems
Arrow, who originally addressed the problem of the distribution of social welfare,
developed these theorems as general statements about a class of functions which
seek to combine hierachies of preference relations. Such functions would be of
great use in any field where a joint policy must be formulated. Clearly, that
includes distributed computing and the “globalization” of local access rules to
databases to form lattices of information flow, §1.4 .
There are two results:
1. Possibility theorem for two–policy elections
Such a collective choice function does exist for elections which have only
a choice between two policies.
2. Impossibility theorem for elections having more than two policies
There is, in general, no such collective choice function for elections having
more than two policies.
The idea behind the proof of the possibility theorem has already been given
in the discussion of deciding sets, condition 3.5, but the same idea is used in the
proof of the impossibility theorem.
5Also called a preventing set in [PB81] or a winning set as defined in [Isb60]. Some useful
rules on winning sets are defined in the latter paper.
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4.1 Conflict Resolution Mechanisms
Arrow’s proof for the impossibility theorem consists of analyzing how a collective
choice function can choose one preference over another. The notation is as used
in §3.1 .
Definition 4.1 (Unanimous Choice). If the voters unanimously agree that
one policy is preferred over all others then that policy is chosen.
∀Y ∈ X
∀i∃x ∈ Y [∀ ~D[ ~D = (≻i)], x ∈ F (Y, ~D)]
∄S∀ ~D′[ ~D′ = (≻1, . . . ,≻i, . . . ,≻n), S = F (Y, ~D′), x ∋ S]
Note that with this formulation it is possible to be indifferent to x, but one
cannot oppose it6. For example, if some voter has ≻= (x = y, y > z, x > z)
then {x, y} = F ({x, y, z}, (≻)).
Definition 4.2 (Biased Choice). If pairs of voters contradict one another
over a policy, one policy is chosen over the other.
∀Y ∈ X
∀x′, y′ ∈ Y ∃i, j ∈ I[i 6= j, x′ > y′ ∈≻i, y
′ > x′ ∈≻j ]
∀ ~D∄S[ ~D = (≻i,≻j), S = F (Y, ~D), y′ ∈ S]
Note that this rule can only be applied pair–wise, it cannot be applied to the
population as a whole.
Definition 4.3 (Unresolved Choice). If pairs of voters contradict one an-
other over a policy, neither policy is chosen.
∀Y ∈ X
∀x′, y′ ∈ Y ∃i, j ∈ I[i 6= j, x′ > y′ ∈≻i, y
′ > x′ ∈≻j ]
∀ ~D∄S[ ~D = (≻i,≻j), S = F (Y, ~D), x′, y′ ∈ S]
This, too, may only be applied pair–wise.
4.2 Inadequacy of Conflict Resolution Mechanisms
Unanimity, with abstentions, does not resolve any conflicts. If one attempts to
do so using one of the other two choice methods, one or more of the conditions
will be breached.
1. Biased Choice
With two voters there is no majority decision, so the collective choice
function must prefer:
(a) Either a policy
6This is, in essence the Pareto principle of social welfare. It can be stated as: “social
welfare is increased by a change that makes at least one individual better off, without making
anybody else worse off[SN89].” Clearly, if one abstains then one feels one is not going to be
worse off if x is chosen. If one opposes x then one would be worse off if x were chosen.
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(b) Or a particular voter’s choice of policy
(c) Or randomly choose one policy
The first two lead to an imposed policy or indicate a dictatorship, respec-
tively; the latter has been suggested [Zec69], but it is rather arbitrary.
2. Unresolved Choice
This method allows anyone to act as a vetoer.
One might think that one can improve the biased choice method so that
it decides in favour of whichever policy has a simple majority over the other.
Unfortunately, if one admits a third voter to make the biased choice decisive,
then one also allows that third voter to present a third policy choice; in which
case, one is attempting to choose between three policies, which is the problem
one is trying to solve.
If, in an attempt to overcome this, one requires that there always be more
voters than issues, then on some issues at least one voter will be a dictator, or
vetoer7. The dictator, or vetoer, is acting as a “Kingmaker”. It is possible to
stand this dilemma on its head (or feet) and use it as the basis for a collective
choice function as in [How89].
4.3 Are the Conditions Reasonable?
Hopefully, it should now be clear that it is not possible to construct a collective
choice function that satisfies all the conditions given above simultaneously. That
said, one can argue that the requirements on the collective choice function’s
behaviour are too demanding.
1. Decisiveness
Implicit in the definition of the collective choice function is that it is
decisive.
2. The Non–imposition and Non–dictatorial Conditions
These conditions come in two forms. The first form is unilateral and
quite acceptable, although it may even be desirable that one particular
voter has an absolute veto over a policy. The other form of the condition
is only invoked in the event of a tie, where the requirement is that no
policy or voter be preferred over another. This, it has been seen, is the
pivotal difference between simple majority rule for a two policy vote and
a three (or more) policy vote. In the two policy vote in the event of there
only being one vote separating those for and those against, every voter is
equally decisive and will be supported by the majority. In a close three (or
more) policy vote, some voters can choose the minority position to force
a tie.
The issue is, again, the decisiveness of the collective choice function and
would so close a result be acceptable.
7This minority power is often said to be the cause of the instability of proportional repre-
sentation parliaments.
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3. Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives
The preferendum, see table 2, and Condorcet pairings are both examples of
collective choice functions that are non–dictatorial but are not free from
the effects of irrelevant alternatives. This is very unfortunate, since an
irrelevant alternative is any policy that is ranked lower than the collective
winner, but is ranked higher than the collective winner by some voters.
This would happen when the voters are assessing the policies with different
underlying values which are more abstract.
If one looks at the rankings made in table 2, it is clear that voter k agrees
with the others that y > z but disagrees with them regarding the merits
of both y and z over both of w and x.
4. Monotonicity
It can also be argued that monotonicity should be sacrificed to achieve
a consensus. There is an attractive suite of collective decision functions
called “Kingmaker Trees”[How89]. These do not demonstrate monotonic
behaviour, but can be used to obtain a decision in the presence of sophis-
ticated voting.
4.4 Are three (or more) policy collective choice functions
usable?
Whether the conditions Arrow imposed on collective choice functions are rea-
sonable only arises when the votes are close and that a sophisticated voter would
vote in such a way that a policy cycle arises. Three (or more) policy votes can
give decisive results and it would be very useful to have them resolve issues: can
one therefore quantify how reliable a collective choice is? How likely is it that
an election has been subverted by sophisticated voters, given the distribution
of votes. Referring again to table 2, if it were possible to compare the two sets
of votes, impartially, an administrator would be able to make a better choice
of final policy. In which case, it would be better to introduce more irrelevant
alternatives to make a more certain choice.
Technologically, this is feasible. There are cryptographic algorithms which
would allow vote sets to be cast secretly [Sch96] and these could then be assessed
by an impartial arbitrator to make the most appropriate choice. The basis for
that choice would be probabilistic and an example of a probabilistic criterion
that could be employed is given next.
5 Max–Min Probabilities in Condorcet Pairings
There is an interesting paper by Usiskin [Usi64], which quantifies the probabil-
ities for Condorcet pairings. The paper addresses the “Voting Paradox”, but
this is slightly misleading, it addresses the organization of votes within commit-
tees. It covers the same ground as the seminal works of Black and Farquharson
[Bla58, Far69], which describe how committee procedures can be abused, if a
policy cycle exists.
In a committee procedure, if there is a policy cycle then for all those voting:
• A > B > C has exactly 13 of vote
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• as does C > A > B
• and B > C > A
If the policies are voted on in pairs, then the order in which they are intro-
duced will determine which is chosen, viz.
• (A vs B) vs C = C ∵ A vs B = A
• (C vs A) vs B = C ∵ C vs A = C
The question that Usiskin resolves is how much more popular than one
another can they be. In the example above, they all have probability of beating,
or of being beaten, of 23 .
Denote by Xi a real–valued random variable that represents the proportion
of a simple majority vote received for policy i. The probability of a simple
majority vote having the outcome that Xi > Xj will be: P (Xi > Xj). A policy
cycle will be revealed if the probabilities for all pairs, P (X1 > X2), P (X2 > X3)
and so on, for n policies is non–zero and, finally, P (Xn > X1) is also non–zero.
The maximum minimum value will represent how much more popular one policy
can be over another so that a policy cycle might still result.
If one then has at least one policy that beats another by an amount that is
greater than this, then there can be no policy cycle.
Theorem 5.1 (Arbitrary Random Variables). The maximum minimum value
for the joint probability distribution of a set of n arbitrary random variables is
given by:
max {min [P (X1 > X2), . . . , P (Xn−1 > Xn), P (Xn > X1)]} =
n− 1
n
(2)
This is as one would expect, looking at the example given above, where
each of A, B and C had a probability of 23 of beating the other, if one of these
had a greater probability than that, there could be no policy cycle. In the
example given above, were there were only three voters, this would mean the
voters unanimously agreed on one policy being preferred over at least one other.
This may not be the winning policy, it would allow at least one policy to be
eliminated, then a two–policy vote can be taken.
This result is rather depressing but one can appreciate its intuitive correct-
ness, because it tells us that the more policies there are, the more difficult it is
to have one policy beating all others.
This case of arbitrary random variables does not help in understanding the
behaviour of sophisticated voters. (The probabilistic events would all be con-
ditioned by at least the previous result, viz.P (Xi > Xi+1|Xi > Xi−1) and
probably would need to be conditioned by all events.
However, Usiskin does present a result which could be used to interpret
sincere voting results. The election results P (Xi > Xj) would be based on
Xi, Xj being independent random variables
Theorem 5.2 (Independent Random Variables). The maximum minimum
value for the joint probability distribution of a set of n independent random vari-
ables is given by:
max {min [P (X1 > X2), . . . , P (Xn−1 > Xn), P (Xn > X1)]} = b(n)
where b(n+ 1) > b(n) and lim
n→∞
b(n) =
3
4
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This latter result is quite encouraging, because if there is an election where
at least one votes has a probability of greater than 34 then no policy cycle can
exist.
Usiskin also demonstrates a method for formulating the function b(n) and
presents some upper and lower bounds.
6 Some Collective Choice Functions
It was mentioned above, in the discussion of quorums, that a simple majority
rule collective choice would be valid even if only one voter expressed a choice
and all the others abstained. Simple majority rule is just one of a number
of collective choice functions that could be employed. It is worthwhile just
listing the collective choice functions. These are only for two policy votes and,
because of Arrow’s conditions, cannot be extended to three (or more) policy
votes, but they are insightful to the acceptability of collective choices. This
summary follows Fishburn, [Fis74] and the details are contained in appendix B,
but suffice to say that when only two policies, x and y, are under consideration
ternary logic can be used with x > y being 1, y < x being −1 and x = y 0.
There are some diagrams that illustrate the different types of voting rule and
outcomes, figure 10
From the discussion above, §4.1 , a Pareto–optimal collective choice function
can also be specified, which is not in the appendix, but is discussed in [ARS98]
where it is called “unanimous with abstentions”.
Rank Rule Paretian
1 Specified Majority Yes
2 Simple Majority Yes
3 Specified Majority No
4 Simple Majority No
Table 4: Ranking of Binary Voting Rules
Simple Majority if s( ~D) > 1 then x > y is the collective choice, see (3).
Non–minority if 1( ~D) > n/2 then x > y is the collective choice, see (4). This
is a special case of the next type of rule.
Specified Majority if 1( ~D) > αn then x > y, where α is some pre–defined
constant in range (0, 1), see (5).
Absolute Majority if 1( ~D) > αn then x > y and y > x otherwise, where α
is some pre–defined constant in range (0, 1), see (5).
Absolute Special Majority if 1( ~D) ≤ αn then y > x, see (6).
Pareto Majority: For if -1( ~D) = 0 and 1( ~D) > 0 then x > y.
Pareto Majority: Indifference if 0( ~D) > 0 and -1( ~D) = 1 = 0 then x = y.
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Absolute special majority is a variant of absolute majority (it is an absolute
majority of votes against) and absolute majority is just a variant of specified
majority where the complement of the policy is not installed if the required vote
count is not reached and, as noted, non–minority rule is a variant of Specified
Majority Rule. So all of these can be replaced by that rule.
It is possible to define a Paretian quality which can be added to any voting
rule and requires there is no dissenting vote. (Paretian indifference can be
thought of as a vote for z , (x = y) as opposed to w =, (x > y) ∨ (y > x), so
it is actually a Paretian vote on a different pair of issues: z and w.) The rules
can be ranked in a qualitative order of difficulty of attaining them, see table 4.
7 Summary
As information systems become more sophisticated they will be used to support
human decision–making. The prospect of constructing virtual organizations
based on how people interact is attractive: they could potentially be more
responsive—Miller describes an evolving information processing organization,
[Mil95], which develops its internal structure using a genetic algorithm. There
are already some prototypes, [HK96, HH94], which share information based on
past usage.
This paper acts as a warning that collective decision–making is not some-
thing to be taken lightly. Even the most sophisticated voting systems can give
rise to erroneous results, §2.2 . Sophisticated voters making policy choices
could give rise to systems falling into stasis or being subverted to execute the
wrong policies. If a discretionary access control mechanism used to control the
release of information from databases were put under the control of collective
choice functions and determined access rights based on the criteria proposed by
Bertino et al. , §1.4 , it would almost certainly prove to be a vulnerable system.
There is clearly a need for a more sophisticated architecture to deal with
access requests which can only be expressed in an enterprise modelling language
which would have components similar to that described by ISO in their ODP,
[ISO95]. This type of information processing system would need software agents
acting on behalf of individuals to ensure that their information is protected.
This would necessarily be a probabilistic analysis, based on how trustworthy
potential information users are and it may prove expedient to develop systems
that are insured against loss or provide degrees of surety, like those proposed
by Neumann et al. [LMN97].
These information systems and their users would constitute an economy very
much like the everyday commercial world occupied by institutions, corporations
and people—only it would be faster, less resource wasteful and, if information
system designers integrate the safeguards before they are used, safer.
A ODP Enterprise Entities
These are Booch [Boo94] class diagrams of the relationships that exist between
entities in a distributed processing system, or, indeed, any organization as de-
scribed in [ISO95, Enterprise Modelling Language].
1. Communities, see figure 5
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Figure 5: Communities, policies and resources
Communities comprise of collections of resources and policies. The com-
munity is itself a resource.
2. Enterprise Agents, see figure 6
Performative agents are also resources. There are three kinds of these:
• Administrators
• Arbitrators
• Policy–Makers
Administrators and arbitrators have policies they follow, but policy–makers
create policy.
3. Resource Users
These are also agents, but are not performative. They will have their own
policies, but they are not explicitly open to arbitration. Resource users
may contact administrators prior to using a resource or they may not, it
depends on the nature of the resource.
Resource users usually control the policy–makers within communities and
this is the case with most societies, since legislative assemblies are usually
elected, but this need not be so. Companies are owned by its sharehold-
ers who appoint the board of directors, the administrators, but may not
use the resources the company makes available. Suffice to say, that, in
practice, in most business processes, the resource users have very little
influence on the policy–makers.
4. Administrators, see figure 7
Administrators control sets of resources. Each consumable resource has a
behaviour and may use other consumable resources. Since there may be
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Figure 7: Administrators, Resources and Behaviour
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different administrators vieing for the same consumable resources conflicts
may arise.
Resource users must obey the policy for using a resource. If there is no
suitable policy, then the prospective user must have policy made. (This
might seem different from what is observed in most organizations, where
one can ask an administrator to apply policy differently in some way:
usually by asking the administrator’s superior to become involved. The
administrator’s superior is then acting as a policy–maker.)
5. Arbitrators, see figure 8
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Figure 8: Arbitrators and Administrators
Arbitrators control adminstrators in that they resolve any conflicts that
arise between them. They control neither administrators nor resources
directly.
6. Policy, see figure 9
Policy is a set of prescriptive statements about the behaviour of a set of
resources: usually one sub–set of those resources vis a` vis another sub–set.
There are three kinds of statement:
• Permission what one sub–set may do with (or for) the other sub–set.
• Requirement (or Obligation) what one sub–set must do with (or for)
the other sub–set.
• Prohibition what one sub–set must not do with (or for) the other
sub–set.
B Collective Choice Functions
What follows is drawn mostly from [Fis74] (who refers to proofs from his own
text[Fis73]: and gives a precise definition of the conditions that a collective
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choice function must fulfill for a particular voting procedure for two policy
alternative systems.
Definition B.1 (Principle of Choice). The basic materials for collective choice
functions are social alternatives (candidates, policies, etc.) and individuals (vot-
ers, members, etc.) who have preferences among the alternatives. The idea of
a collective choice function is to map a non–empty subset of the potential feasi-
ble subset of alternatives to each ordered pair consisting of a potential feasible
subset of alternatives and a schedule of the voters’ preferences. The assigned
set is often referred to as the choice set.
How that mapping is achieved is based on the properties of the collective
choice function, which decides whether the choice is:
• Egalitarian
• Weighted
• Representative
• Unbiased (or neutral)
• Decisive
• Unanimous
B.1 Two Policies
If each individual has only two policies to choose from, then the policy chosen
by the population as a whole will always be one of them, so two policy systems
cannot select a set of policies that an individual has not specified.
Definition B.2 (Sets for Two Policies). The sets can be enumerated quite
easily for two policies x, y. If a voter prefers x to y, then 1 else if y to x then
−1 else 0 signifies indifference—ternary logic.
Policies
X = {x, y}
X = {X}
so write
F ( ~D) for F (X, ~D)
n voters
~D = (D1, D2, . . . , Dn)
where Di ∈ {1, 0,−1}
so {1, 0,−1}n , P
(
~D
)
and ~D ⊆ {1, 0,−1}n
For the collective choice function over n individuals:
F : {1, 0,−1}n 7→ {1, 0,−1}
Note that the power set of the preferences is written {1, 0,−1}n as shorthand
and is the set of all permutations of vectors of length n where each component
can take one of three values—#{1, 0,−1}n = 3n. When a condition is applied
to a preference profile, it is either applied with reference to the power set or the
vote set: the power set, although large, is denumerable a priori, the vote set is
not.
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B.2 Egalitarian
Egalitarian8 collective choice functions treat each voter’s vote as identical in
effect to every other’s.
Condition B.1 (Strongly Neutral). A collective choice function F is Strongly
Neutral, if, for all ~D ∈ {1, 0,−1}n:
F (− ~D) = −F ( ~D) (Strongly Neutral)
Condition B.2 (Strongly Monotonic). A collective choice function F is Strongly
Monotonic, if, for any ~D, ~D′ ∈ {1, 0,−1}n:
~D ≥ ~D′ ⇒ F ( ~D) ≥ F ( ~D′)
~D > ~D′, F ( ~D′) = 0⇒ F ( ~D) = 1
(Strongly Monotonic)
Condition B.3 (Egalitarian). A collective choice function F is Egalitarian,
if for all ~D ∈ {1, 0,−1}n:
F (D1, . . . , Dn) = F (Dσ(1), . . . , Dσ(n))
if σ is a permutation on {1, . . . , n}
(Egalitarian)
Theorem B.1 (Conditions for Simple Majority Rule[May52]). A collec-
tive choice function F implements simple majority rule over two policies and has
the following qualities: Strongly Neutral, Strongly Monotonic and Egalitarian.
Definition B.3 (Simple Majority Rule). If F applies ternary logic, it can
be implemented with:
F (D) , s( ~D) (3)
Condition B.4 (Monotonic). A collective choice function is just Monotonic,
rather than Strongly Monotonic if, for any ~D, ~D′ ∈ {1, 0,−1}n:
~D ≥ ~D′ ⇒ F ( ~D) ≥ F ( ~D′) (Monotonic)
Definition B.4 (Non–minority Rule). If a collective choice function is Strongly
Neutral, Monotonic and Egalitarian and is implemented thus:
F ( ~D) = 1⇔ 1( ~D) > n/2
F ( ~D) = −1⇔ -1( ~D) > n/2
(4)
then the voting system is known as non–minority rule.
8Fishburn in [Fis74] uses the term “anonymous” for egalitarian and “dual” for neutral.
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Non–minority rule is just one of a class of neutral, monotonic and egalitarian
collective choice functions; they differ in effect from the strongly monotonic sim-
ple majority rule by having a “dead–band”. A geometric insight into the speci-
fication of a collective choice function can be given using a unit simplex[Saa94].
There is only one dimension.
~q = (
1( ~D)
n
,
-1( ~D)
n
)
The election vector ~q emanates from the origin and will always be within [−1, 1].
Under simple majority rule, whichever point, −1 or 1, the vector is closest to
wins. Under non–minority rule the vector has to be over half 12 way towards
the point, see figure 10. The indecisive region in the centre is symmetric. For
non–minority rule, any boundary can be chosen, so long as it is symmetric about
the origin.
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Figure 10: Two policy voting systems
It should be clear from figure 10 that a simple majority voting system can
determine policy if only one voter is not indifferent to either of the policies, the
others abstaining. In this respect, non–minority rule seems to impose a natural
quorum, since it requires that at least half of the voters have chosen one or
the other policy. In this respect, non–minority rule is less questionable as a
decision–making device than simple majority rule. Most electoral systems do in
fact operate a non–minority rule system.
Condition B.5 (Neutral). A collective choice function is Neutral, as opposed
to Strongly Neutral, if, for all ~D ∈ {1, 0,−1}n:
1( ~D) 6= -1( ~D)⇒ F (− ~D) = −F ( ~D) (Neutral)
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Condition B.6 (Strongly Decisive). A collective choice function is Strongly
Decisive if, for all ~D ∈ {1, 0,−1}n:
F ( ~D) 6= 0 (Strongly Decisive)
Condition B.7 (Unanimity unambiguous). A collective choice function is
Unanimity unambiguous if:
F (~1) = 1 and F ( ~−1) = −1 (Unanimity unambiguous)
Condition B.8 (Pro–biased). A collective choice function is Pro–biased if,
for all ~D ∈ {1, 0,−1}n:
if ~D = ~D′ except that (Di, D
′
i) = (0, 1)
for some i then F ( ~D) = F ( ~D′)
(Pro–biased)
The number of electoral ties can be reduced by downgrading Strongly Neutral
to Neutral and adding Strongly Decisive. If Neutral is dropped then an electoral
preference is given to one policy over the other. The policy that is preferred is
usually already in force and is therefore called the incumbent, the other policy is
the challenging policy. See figure 10 for the asymmetry of the indecisive region
under an absolute majority rule.
Definition B.5 (Absolute Majority Rule). If the collective choice function
is no longer Neutral and is made Strongly Decisive, and the function is imple-
mented thus:
F ( ~D) = 1⇔ 1( ~D) > αn
F ( ~D) = −1⇔ 1( ~D) ≤ αn
for α ∈ (0, 1)
(5)
then these are the absolute majority rule functions. A special case is unaminous
rule which requires either all votes are −1 or 1.
Definition B.6 (Absolute Special Majority Rule). As for absolute major-
ity rule, but the function is also (Unanimity unambiguous) and (Pro–biased).
The collective choice function can be implemented by:
F ( ~D) = −1⇔ 1( ~D) ≤ αn
for α ∈ (0, 1)
(6)
B.3 Non–Egalitarian: Weighted
The effect of the Egalitarian property is that one voter’s preference can be
exchanged for another within the decision profile and it will have no effect on
the evaluation of the collective choice function. An alternative system is to use a
weighted system, which is often used by some committees, where the chairman
is given both a deliberative and a casting vote. Weighted systems have a number
of attractions because they can be designed so that:
• No one person can dictate policy to the group.
• Ties can be readily resolved without a further vote.
The simplest way to define a weighted voting function is to use a weighting
vector.
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Weighted Voting
Definition B.7 (Weighting Vector and Vote). A weighting vector can be
defined thus:
~ρ〈n〉 > ~0〈n〉,~ρ = (ρ1, . . . , ρn)
where ρi ≥ 0, ρi ∈ Z
+
0 is the weight assigned to each voter
Then
Weighted Vote ~ρ · ~D
Weight Function W (~ρ) ,
n∑
i=1
ai
Weight of c ∈ {1, 0,−1}Wc( ~D) ,W ((~ρ · ~D) : Di = c) =
n∑
i=1
ρiDi for those Di = c
It does not follow that n(~ρ) ≥ n because it is possible to set any number of
ρi equal to zero, but at least one must be non–zero.
Theorem B.2 (Weighted Majority Function). A function F , F : {1, 0,−1}n 7→
{1, 0,−1}, is a weighted majority function if and only if it satisfies Monotonic,
Unanimity unambiguous and Neutral, the weighted majority function can be de-
fined as F ( ~rho · ~D) = s(~ρ · ~D).
The conditions can be readily tested by substituting F (~ρ · ~D) for F ( ~D).
The other systems can be added thus:
1. Non–minority rule
F (~ρ · ~D) =


1 W1(~ρ · ~D) >
W (~ρ)
2
−1 W−1(~ρ · ~D) >
W (~ρ)
2
0 Otherwise
2. Absolute majority
F (~ρ · ~D) =


1 W1(~ρ · ~D) > αW (~ρ)
−1 W−1(~ρ · ~D) ≤ αW (~ρ)
0 Otherwise
Dictators and Vetoers The final choice may be wholly determined by only
one of the voters, in which case that voter is either a dictator or a vetoer.
1. Dictator
Definition B.8 (Dictator). A voter, j, is a Dictator with regard to a
collective choice function F and a weighting vector ~ρ if:
For all ~D ∈ {1, 0,−1}n such that
~D = (D1, . . . , Dj , . . . , Dn)
when Dj 6= 0, F (~ρ · ~D) = Dj
(Dictator)
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Whether a dictator can effect all decision profiles is a condition on the
behaviour of the collective choice function and the weighting vector, not
on the voters, which is as follows.
Definition B.9 (Undominated by dictator). A collective choice func-
tion is Undominated by dictator if there is no Dictator. This can be stated
thus:
For all ~D ∈ ~D
There is no i such that
~D = (D1, . . . , Di, . . . , Dn),
Di 6= 0 and F ( ~D) = Di
(Undominated by dictator)
This is not particularly useful, since there may legitimately be a voter
whose vote is always in line with the choice of the group as a whole.
2. Vetoer
Definition B.10 (Vetoer). The first voter, 1, is a Vetoer with regard
to a collective choice function F and a weighting vector ~ρ if:
For
~D1 = (0, 1, . . . , 1)
~D−1 = (0,−1, . . . ,−1)
F (~ρ · ~D1) = 0
F (~ρ · ~D−1) = 0
(Vetoer)
(The vetoer is in first position for convenience).
Whether a vetoer can effect those two very specific decision profiles is
a condition on the behaviour of the collective choice function and the
weighting vector, not on the voters, which is as follows.
Definition B.11 (Undominated by vetoer). A group of voters are Un-
dominated by vetoer if there is no voter j, such that:
If
Dj = 1, F (~ρ · ~D1) = 1, and
Dj = −1, F (~ρ · ~D−1) = −1
but
Dj 6= 1, F (~ρ · ~D1) = 0
Dj 6= −1, F (~ρ · ~D−1) = 0
(Undominated by vetoer)
For all ~D ∈ ~D.
This, again, is not particularly useful, since there may legitimately be a
voter whose always votes against the group.
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Sensitivity
Definition B.12 (Essential). A voter i is said to be Essential with regard to
a collective choice function, and weighting vector, if at least one of the following
conditions holds:
Either F (~ρ · ~D1) 6= F (~ρ · ~D0)
Or F (~ρ · ~D−1) 6= F (~ρ · ~D0)
Or F (~ρ · ~D1) 6= F (~ρ · ~D−1)
(Essential)
For at least one of the vectors ~D1, ~D0, ~D−1 constructed as follows:
~D1 = (D1, . . . , Di−1, 1, Di+1, . . . , Dn)
~D0 = (D1, . . . , Di−1, 0, Di+1, . . . , Dn)
~D−1 = (D1, . . . , Di−1,−1, Di+1, . . . , Dn)
where the contents of those vectors can be taken from any of the vectors con-
structed thus:
~D〈n−1〉 = (D1, . . . , Di−1, Di+1, . . . , Dn) ∈ {1, 0,−1}
n−1
This condition requires that a voter can be decisive in at least one decision
profile. It prevents a voter from being given so ineffectual a vote that it is never
decisive in any election.
B.3.1 Vetoer, Dictator and Essential
By this it is meant safe from dictators and vetoers and sensitive to voters; it
is desirable if a collective choice function and weighting vector could be chosen
so that for all decision profiles in {1, 0,−1}n there is no voter who is either a
Dictator or a Vetoer. It would also be desirable there is at least one voter who
is Essential.
The collective choice functions simple majority, non–minority and absolute
majority are demonstrably safe from dictators and vetoers when used under an
egalitarian regime so only the weighting vector needs to be checked.
Dictators, Vetoers and Weighting Vectors
1. Weighted majority and weighted non–minority rule
If the collective choice function is either of the above, for ~ρ = (ρ1, . . . , ρn)
and the weighting vector has been scaled so that ρ1 has weight 1. In
which case, the worst case for the dictator is that all vote against, so for
the dictator to succeed ρdictator >
W (~ρ)
/ 2.
Because both of these collective choice functions are dual; it should be
clear ρdictator = ρvetoer .
Consequently, ρmax <
W (~ρ)
2 , is sufficient for both of these.
2. Absolute majority
To succeed, ρdictator > α ·W (~ρ), so the converse is required.
A vetoer has it easier ρvetoer > (1− α) ·W (~ρ), so the converse.
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Weighting Vectors that are Essential to Voters Under egalitarian rule,
all voting functions are sensitive to all voters, because if any voter is sensitive,
a permutation can put another voter in his place, so again the collective choice
function will not be at fault should a system of rule prove insensitive, it will be
the weighting vector.
There are two possibilities:
• The voter has a weighting of zero
• The voter has a weighting which can never be decisive
Whether a voter has a non–zero vote can only be tested for; probably by
using the weighted majority rule function with all other voters not voting.
Having a vote that is never decisive is more subtle. The weighting vector is
as usual, with the lowest rated voter in first position having value 1. Construct
a dictator to each voter in the following manner.
ρ1 = 1
ρ2 = ρ1 + 1
ρ3 = ρ2 + ρ1 + 1
. . .
ρn−1 = ρn−2 + · · ·+ ρ2 + ρ1 + 1
ρn = ρn−1 + ρn−2 + · · ·+ ρ2 + ρ1 + 1
ρn = ρn−1 + ρn−1
ρn = 2ρn−1
ρn = 2 · 2 · · n− 1 times · 1
ρn = 2
n−1
A necessary conditions on weighting vectors can be set, each ρi < 2
n−1 if
W (~ρ) ≥ 2n − 1—geometric progression. There are effectively two choices:
• Set n ≥ 3, max ρi = 2
n−1 − 1, in which case W (~ρ) ≥ 2n − 2 and all other
voters will tie with the largest voter.
• Set n ≥ 4,max ρi = 2
n−1 − 2, in which case W (~ρ) ≥ 2n − 3 and all other
voters will defeat the largest voter.
For ~ρ = (ρ1, . . . , ρi, . . . , ρn)
∄ρi >
1
2
n∑
j=1
ρj
B.4 Representative Systems
A representative system can be thought of as a heirachy of voting councils in
which the outcomes of votes in lower councils become votes in higher councils.
A voter in one of the higher councils may be a voter or a voting council. Each
voting council can use weighted majority rule between its members. Voters (or
councils) can vote more than once in different councils.
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Definition B.13 (Representation). Let a heirachy of voting councils be de-
fined as a representation R. Let each level of representation be denoted by a
suffix, the lowest level being R0.
To make the lowest level similar in mathematical structure to higher levels,
we shall introduce a selection function Si which selects from a preference profile,
D, the preference of voter i.
Si : {1, 0,−1}
n 7→ {1, 0,−1}
Si(D) = Di
R0 can then be written as:
R0 = {S1(D), . . . , Sn(D)}
So R0 is simply the decision profile as a set.
Thereafter, there is a level m ∈ N which is such that:
Rm = {s(F1, . . . , FK)(Rm−1)}
This is effectively voting using a tree structure and is probably the most used
organizational control system. Unfortunately, it is proving to be very difficult
to analyze. Hopefully, more results will arise.
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